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Thinking the Unthinkable: What Should
Commercial Banks or Their Holding Companies
Be Allowed to Own?
CYNTHIA C. LIcHTENsTmIN*
INTRODUCTION
Long before Congress enshrined the shibboleth of the separation of
banking and commerce in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,1 states
in chartering state banks and Congress in chartering national banks limited
banks to the "business of banking" 2 by deliberately failing to provide
intermediaries with the power to take shares in other corporations. 3 The
expressed reason for the restriction was the need to ensure that commercial
banks, which were chartered to funnel deposits from the public into short-
term working capital loans to businesses, did not make themselves illiquid
with equity investments or risk those deposits in businesses that the bank
was ill equipped to manage. The restriction's effect, however, was to ensure
that the banks did not sneak into other forms of business through investment
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; Consultant, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley
& McCloy, New York; M.C.L., University of Chicago; J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Radcliffe
College. Thanks are due to the Boston College law students who served as legal research
assistants during the gestation of this Article: Lori Bodwell, Christopher Hurley, Andrea
Tebbetts, and Dmitri Gounaris.
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988 & Supp. 1989-1990) (§ 1845 repealed 1966). The original
Act applied only to bank holding companies owning or controlling two or more commercial
banks. It was less a response by Congress to the use of a holding company to combine banking
and nonbanking business than it was an effort to preserve the local character of banking by
ensuring that the holding company device was not used to permit national expansion across
local and state lines. Only after the money center banks, led by what was then First National
City Bank, proceeded to use the holding company form (with a one-bank holding company
not at that time subject to the Act) for expansion into other forms of business did Congress
in the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 focus full force on the policy of
separation of banking and commerce policy. See generally Lichtenstein, Foreign Participation
in United States Banking: Regulatory Myths and Realities, 15 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. Rnv.
879, 917 (1974). For the early history of the BHCA, see Hackley, Our Baffling Banking
System, 52 VA. L. Rv. 565, 569-80 (1966).
2. See Symons, The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L.
Ray. 676 (1983); see also Corrigan, The Banking-Commerce Controversy Revisited, FED. REs.
BANK N.Y.Q. Rav., Spring 1991, at 1.
3. However, entities chartered as "banks" were given the power to take shares in such
quasi-public enterprises as canal building and operation that the states wanted to support with
deposits.
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in the equity of commercial companies. 4 Banking regulators came to see the
value of this effect as concern over the potential for banks and bank holding
companies to self-deal became apparent.
As this Article will explain, the dual concerns of protecting the safety
and soundness of banks and of preventing overreaching continue to drive
banking regulation today. However, the means chosen by Congress to
implement those purposes confuses them, making domestic compliance
inefficient and costly. Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) has
compounded the problem internationally because it has exported the do-
mestic notions about the means of separating banking and commerce into
the newly revised Regulation K, the mechanism by which the Fed regulates
bank holding companies operating abroad. 5 The consequence is unnecessary
interference with United States banks' ability to compete internationally.
This Article begins by examining how the idea of equity lnits developed
domestically. It then discusses in detail how this notion was exported into
Regulation K and how it affects both the securities and investment operations
of United States banking organizations operating overseas. The Article
concludes with recommendations for congressional action to eliminate the
confusion these notions cause both at home and abroad.
I. DOMESTIC LIMITS ON EQUITY INVESTMENTS
A. The Evolution of Limitations
Even before passage of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 6 banks,
by definition, were to be judges of credit worthiness, not venture capitalists
or entrepreneurs making judgments as to what would sell. The states had
too much experience with companies with banking powers that failed in
their other ventures and went under, taking their deposits and their out-
standing notes with them. 7 Banking was thus separated from commerce, for
safety and soundness reasons, by a prohibition on equity investment.
During the period of enactment of banking statutes by the major com-
mercial states and at the time of enactment of the National Bank Act8 by
4. Two thirds of a century later, the states have broadened the authority of their banks
to make a wide variety of equity investments. See HOOD, REGULATION AND STRUCTURE OF
TRADmONAL BANKNG AcTrivrrms 88-92 (Institute of Banking Law and Regulation 1989). It is
just this authority that the Administration would like to control on the federal side, but only
in the interest of protecting the federal insurance fund. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREAsuRy,
MODERNiziNG THE FmANciA. SYsTEM[:] RECOmMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE ComPETrIvE
BANKs 48 (1991).
5. 56 Fed. Reg. 19,549 (1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 211 & 265) [hereinafter
Regulation K].
6. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988 & Supp. 1989-1990) (§ 1845 repealed 1966).
7. E. SYMONS & J. WmrE, BANKING LAW TEACHING MATERLAmS 21-26 (3d ed. 1991).
8. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864).
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Congress, there was no concern with the nature of the shareholders in such
banks or with the possibility of combining banking and commerce in a
holding company. While a shareholder might be engaged in commerce, the
bank was not so engaged; the shareholder's activities were not considered
a threat to the bank's safety and soundness. 9
The recognition that bank affiliations could threaten the bank burst upon
the scene with the Great Depression and the hearings Congress held prior
to passage of the Banking Act of 1933.10 The result was the separation of
commercial banking and investment banking in the Glass-Steagall Act," not
because investment banking was a business so foreign to commercial banking
that it could not be considered within the capacities of commercial bankers,
but because of what the Supreme Court has termed, in an infamous phrase,
the "subtle hazards" of the combination.
1 2
In 1933, Congress took a preliminary look at member banks"' other
affiliations and set up a system requiring those owning or acquiring control
9. The National Bank Act contained a double liability provision for shareholders, making
them equally ratable and liable "for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association
[the national bank] to the extent of the amount ... invested in such shares." Id. at 103.
Thus, in theory, depositors were protected from bank failure by having the double liability of
the national bank's shareholders to fall back upon. By the 1920s, however, Congress had
shifted its focus from imposing liability on shareholders to regulating director and officer
control of bank funds in developing an investment portfolio. See H. Wu.us & J. CHAPMAN,
THE BANrdNO SITUATION: AMEmcAN POST-WAR PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENTS 532 (1934). The
double liability provisions were all but removed with the institution in 1933 of the federal
scheme of deposit insurance.
10. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162. Just what the hearings purported to discover concerning the evils
of affiliation of banks and investment bankers (securities affiliates) has been extensively
analyzed and will not be repeated here. See, e.g., Isaac & Fein, Facing the Future-Life
Without Glass-Steagall, 37 CATH. U.L. REv. 281 (1988); Kurucza, Ballen & McTaggart,
Securities and Investment Activities of Banks, 43 Bus. LAw. 1107 (1988); McGarvey, Comment,
Federal Regulation of Bank Securities Activities: Will Congress Allow Glass-Steagall to be
Shattered?, 12 J. CoNTEMa. L. 99 (1986); Norton, Up Against "The Wall". Glass-Steagall and
the Dilemma of a Deregulated ("Reregulated") Banking Environment, 42 Bus. LAW. 327
(1987).
11. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377-78 (1988).
12. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971).
13. "Member banks" are banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and
subject to an additional layer of federal supervision. National banks are required to be
members; state incorporated banks may choose to become members and, if they do, subject
themselves to certain prudential limitations imposed upon national banks. See E. SYMONS &
J. WHrm, supra note 7, at 26. For example, Congress in the Glass-Steagall Act chose to
forbid all entities taking deposits subject to check to be at the same time "engaged in the
business of issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing ... securities," 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1),
but only forbade affiliations between member banks and companies engaged principally in
such business. 12 U.S.C. § 377. Thus, there is no federal ban on such state nonmember bank
affiliations unless the FDIC declares the connection with a securities business to be an "unsafe
and unsound" practice, and the FDIC has generally deferred to the states' notions of what
are appropriate affiliations for state banks. However, Congress applied to nonmember insured
banks the "firewall" provisions regulating bank lending to affiliates that had previously only
applied to member banks and their affiliates. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 12(c),
80 Stat. 236, 242. See infra text accompanying note 17.
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over a member bank to apply to the Federal Reserve (the Fed) for permits
to vote their stock.' 4 The Fed could also examine and require reports from
the holding company affiliates. The voting and reporting requirements did
not prevent, nor apparently were they intended to prevent, the combination
of banking and commerce through a holding company; they simply gave
the Fed a method of supervising bank affiliations. However, unlike the
states' banking statutes and the National Bank Act, which did not address
solvency of bank owners, Congress in 1933 was concerned with the financial
stability of the holding company structure: It required a ratio of assets in
the holding company to support the subsidiary bank's balance sheet."
Equally as important as the financial stability of the holding company
was a new concern: that bank deposits might be used to make unfair and
undeserved loans to affiliates. The affiliate provisions of the Banking Act
of 1933 had a third prong that put limits on the total quantum of loans a
bank subsidiary could make to other affiliates and required those loans to
be heavily secured. 6 The provision arose out of fear that a bank's owners
could overreach; that is, a bank subsidiary could be used to give a com-
petitive advantage to the bank owners' other businesses. This prong, section
23A of the Federal Reserve Act, was, and still is, the first "firewall" to
insulate a bank from its affiliates so that the bank's credit decisions will
be neutral.
1
Thus, by the time Congress began to consider the Bank Holding Company
Act, there existed two ways of dealing with the tendency of bank owners
to self-deal. One was the method used in the Glass-Steagall Act, which was
to prohibit absolutely joint ownership of securities firms and commercial
banks. The second was the method used in section 23A of the Federal
14. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 19, 48 Stat. 162, 186 (1933); see also Lichtenstein,
supra note 1, at 891-94.
15. See Banking Act of 1933 § 19, 48 Stat. at 187 (adding paragraph (b) to R.S. 5144, 12
U.S.C. § 61 (1988)). Five years after enactment of the Banking Act of 1933, the holding
company affiliate was required to possess
readily marketable assets other than bank stock in an amount not less than 12
per centum of the aggregate par value of all bank stocks controlled by such
holding company affiliate, which amount shall be increased by not less than 2
per centum per annum of such aggregate par value until such assets shall amount
to 25 per centum of the aggregate par value of such bank stocks; and (2) shall
reinvest in readily marketable assets other than bank stock all net earnings over
and above 6 per centum per annum on the book value of its own shares
outstanding until such assets shall amount to such 25 per centum of the aggregate
par value of all bank stocks controlled by it ....
Id.
16. Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 371c. This third prong was extensively overhauled
by the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (1982). See Lichtenstein, supra note 1, at 891-94, for a description of the original § 23A
of the Federal Reserve Act and amendments to it.
17. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 23A, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (as added June 16, 1933, ch.
89, § 13, 48 Stat. 183 (1933), codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988)).
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Reserve Act, which was to place special restrictions on lending and other
relationships between a bank and its sisters or parent.18
B. The Bank Holding Company Act
and Its Confused Policy Purposes
By 1956, Congress determined that, at least with respect to companies
owning two or more banks, a holding company system, the method of
totally prohibiting joint ownership of nonfinancial firms and commercial
banks would be the preferable way of attacking the self-dealing problem.
Although Congress in successive amendments to the Bank Holding Company
Act has tinkered with the concept of what is included in "banking" and
other financial business and what is impermissible nonfinancial business,
the BHCA since 1956 has forbidden any company that owns banks or, as
of 1970, a bank 9 to own or control five percent or more of the voting
stock of companies engaged in impermissible activities. 20 This prohibition
includes indirect ownership of voting stock through nonbank subsidiaries
of the holding company and, although the interpretive issue is presently in
litigation,2' possibly ownership through bank subsidiaries of the holding
company.
Since the measurement of the holding company system's investment is
the percentage of the investee's voting stock that the holding company
owns, this prohibition is not driven by concern for the financial health of
the holding company and its banks. If prudential concerns were at issue,
the limit would be a ratio of the holding company's capital to the amount
invested" or even a total amount beyond which the regulator would have
to review the proposal. 23
Since a prohibition on holding voting stock of nonfinancial companies is
not an efficacious method of preserving the health of banks as equity
18. Id.
19. The definition of the term "bank" has required adjusting. For the complete redefinition,
see 12 U.S.C. § 1841c (1988), as rewritten by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 553.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1843c.
21. See Citicorp v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 936 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.
1991); Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
890 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 44 (1990).
22. For the European Economic Community's method of handling the prudential issue,
see Council Directive 89/646, art. 12, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1, 7 (Second Council Directive of 15
December 1989 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions
Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending
Directive 77/780) [hereinafter Second Banking Directive].
23. It is true that a limit based on a percentage of the equity owned is a rough surrogate
for distinguishing between a portfolio investment and an entrepreneurial joint venture in a
business that the banking organization knows little about in terms of management. Presumably,
however, if banks and their owners know only credit and not investment, neither should be
allowed to invest in equity at all. Nevertheless, bank holding companies are not prohibited




owners, one can only conclude that the BHCA prohibition is related to the
issue of overreaching. But this line of thought raises the question: If an
elaborate system of firewalls is sufficient to avoid the "subtle hazards" of
combining commercial and investment banking,2 why would not firewalls
between a system's banks and its other interests take care of similar
overreaching hazards in the combination of banking and commerce?
Such firewalls already exist in sections 23A and B of the Federal Reserve
Act.2 Moreover, it is easy enough to institute a prohibition on depository
institutions' lending to bank holding company affiliates or to insist that the
parent nonbanking holding company do all the funding of the commercial
arms. It is also easy to draft a prohibition that would limit participation in
the payments system to the highly supervised banks in the system. 26 With
such prohibitions, a company owning a bank would not invest in a com-
mercial enterprise unless the managers believed that the enterprise could
attract financing from nonaffiliated lenders.
In effect, the Treasury Department reached this conclusion concerning
the present separation of banking and commerce in the United States
regulatory structure. 27 The Treasury proposed legislation that would permit
commercial enterprises to invest-indirectly-in banks. 28 However, the
Treasury in drafting its legislation became entangled in elaborate conceptions
concerning the prudential function of the BHCA bank/commerce separation
and has provided for financial services holding companies, which, like their
predecessors, the bank holding companies, are limited to holding no more
than five percent of the voting stock of nonfinancial companies. Given that
the bill would permit nonfinancial company investment in the financial
services holding companies, why should one complain about the retention
of the old BHCA test? The remainder of this Article tries to make this
case.
24. The Supreme Court has approved such precautions in upholding the Fed's way of
letting banks into the securities business. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207 (1984). Congress has reiterated its approval in each bill crafted
in recent years to modernize bank regulation in the United States and to repeal Glass-Steagall.
See Financial Modernization Act of 1989, S. 1886, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. For Congress's
current restructuring efforts, see Deposit Insurance and Regulatory Reform Act of 1991, H.R.
6, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 157, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.; Comprehensive Deposit Reform
and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, S. 543, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1.
26. Scott, Deregulation and Access to the Payment System, 23 HARv. J. oN LEcus. 331
(1986).
27. Section 1001 of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988 & Supp. 1989), directed the Treasury Department to
conduct a study of the United States Federal Deposit Insurance System and to include the
Treasury's suggestions for modernizing the U.S. regulatory structure for financial institutions.
See DEPARTMENT OF rHE TREASURY, supra note 4. H.R. 6, supra note 24, is the House Banking
Committee's much redrafted version of the bill that the Treasury introduced into the House
to implement its study recommendations.
28. Supra note 24.
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II. INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND EQUITY LIMITATIONS
ON SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
In April, 1991, the Fed, the regulatory authority primarily concerned with
regulation of United States banking organizations' foreign activities, released
its complete revision of the International Banking Regulation, Regulation
K. 29 In the process of revising Regulation K, the Fed staff tried to reconcile
the notions it had developed in carrying out its responsibilities under the
BHCA to separate banking and commerce by counting equity to make sure
no one was sneaking into "impermissible" activities with the congressional
authority granted United States banks in the Edge Act 0 to invest indirectly
in equity abroad-and, indeed, to hold equity abroad in the course of
international securities activities. The revisions demonstrate intellectual con-
fusion in both the changes to investment powers for United States banks
under Regulation K and the additional regulation imposed upon United
States banks' participation in the international securities markets.
A. The Evolution of Edge Corporations and Regulation K
In 1919, when Congress, through the Edge Act, provided for federal
incorporation of organizations (Edge Corporations) to engage in "interna-
tional or foreign banking or other international or foreign financial oper-
ations,"'" Congress intended not only to encourage United States exports,
but also to use American capital to help rebuild war-devastated Europe.
Congress specifically expected Edge Corporations to act as merchant banks,
taking equity and long-term debt interests in European enterprises. Thus,
even though Edge Corporations were granted broad banking powers, in-
cluding such banking and financial operations as the Fed might determine
to be usual abroad where the Edge Corporation was conducting its business,
Congress also specifically gave Edge Corporations the authority, subject to
the Fed's consent, to "purchase and hold" stock or "other certificates of
ownership" in foreign or domestic corporations so long as those corpora-
tions were not engaged in general commercial business in the United States
but were only transacting business in the United States connected to their
international or foreign business.3 2 At the time, Congress had no intention,
so far as can be learned from the legislative history of the Edge Act, of
exporting abroad the United States' conception of the necessity of separation
29. Regulation K, supra note 5.
30. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-618 (1988).
31. Id. § 611.
32. Ch. 18, § 615c, 41 Stat. 380 (1919). Similar authority was not granted to national
banks or state member banks at that time or now.
1992]
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of banking and commerce, later enshrined in 1956 and 1970 in the Bank
Holding Company Act's prohibitions.
However, Congress in 1919 was not unconcerned with the prudential
aspects of these new international banking entities it was authorizing. For
example, the Edge Act (in a now-repealed provision) limited the total
liabilities of an Edge Corporation." In addition, any Edge Corporation that
intended to invest more than ten percent of its capital and surplus in any
one corporation (more than fifteen percent in a corporation engaged in the
business of banking) needed-and still needs-the Fed's approval.3 4 Fur-
thermore, to ensure that domestic banks did not become too heavily invested
in these broadly defined new international merchant banking organizations,
Congress authorized national banks3" to invest in these new entities, as well
as in state-chartered corporations with similar powers (so-called Agreement
Corporations), but only up to an amount in the aggregate not exceeding
ten percent of paid-in capital and surplus of the investing national or state
member bank. In short, Congress provided as the prudential measure a cap
on total investment by United States banks in the new activities and
investments abroad and indicated that the Fed was to look specifically at
any Edge investment representing more than ten percent of the Edge
Corporation's capital and surplus.
When Congress in the 1950s enacted, and in 1970 revised, the BHCA
3 6
to regulate the growing combination of domestic banking and nonfinancial
activities through the bank holding company device, it did not touch the
Edge Act's structure. Nor does the legislative history of either the BHCA
or its 1970 amendments indicate any interest on Congress's part in exporting
the domestically mandated separation of banking and commerce. To the
contrary, the legislative history of the International Banking Act of 1978,
which provided the federal structure for foreign bank entry into the United
States, is replete with congressional efforts to ensure that domestic regulation
of foreign banks would not impose the United States notion extraterritorially
on foreign banks in their foreign business.3 7 The BHCA does have specific
exemptions for foreign bank holding company activities or holdings, all
subject to the Fed's discretion, as well as a special provision for United
33. Act of Dec. 24, 1919, ch. 18, 41 Stat. 378, 380, repealed by International Banking Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
35. State banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System are also covered by this
congressional authorization. Together, these two categories today cover all but a minuscule
number of U.S. banks engaged in business abroad.
36. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988).
37. See, e.g., Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Banks and the Non-Banking Activities of
Foreign Bank Holding Companies: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government
Operations, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 276 (1980) (statement of John G.
Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency).
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States bank holding company ownership (otherwise than through an Edge
Corporation) of foreign companies whose business in the United States is
only "incidental. ' 31 However, as far as the structure of overseas activities
conducted by a United States bank through its Edge Corporation is con-
cerned, one can assume that Congress meant that structure to be exempt
from bank holding company regulation under the BHCA exemption for
"shares ... of the kinds and amounts eligible for investment by" national
banks. 9
When Congress decided to regulate foreign bank entry into the United
States banking markets in the International Banking Act of 1978, it also
overhauled certain aspects of the Edge Act (not relevant here) and rewrote
its instructions to the Fed as to how it should regulate Edge Corporations.-
Since Congress was thinking about the powers of foreign banks in the
United States, it added to its statement of purposes of the Edge Act the
command that Edge Corporations should have "powers sufficiently broad
to enable them to compete effectively with similar foreign-owned institutions
in the United States and abroad." 4t In connection with this broadening of
the instructions to the Fed, Congress instructed the Fed to undertake every
five years a review of its regulations under the Edge Act "to ensure that
such purposes are being served."
'42
At the time of the 1978 Act, the Fed had already permitted some United
States banks to have securities activities abroad through their Edge Cor-
poration subsidiaries, 43 and Edge Corporation subsidiaries had been acquir-
ing, since the original enactment of the Edge Act, equity interests in foreign
companies. This activity suggests that the Fed had concluded that Congress
did not intend to export fundamental notions of domestic banking regula-
tion. The Fed's present staff, however, in preparing the 1991 revisions to
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13).
39. Id. § 1843(c)(5).
40. The Fed over the years has regulated the foreign business conducted by United States
banks through Edge Corporations (as well as Edge Corporations themselves) under Regulation
K. Member bank direct foreign operations, either through foreign branches or the ownership
of foreign banks other than through an Edge Corporation, were regulated until 1979 under
Regulation M. Apparently assuming that the Edge Act and the BHCA were independent
schemes of regulation, the Fed, until 1979, covered foreign activities of a regulated bank
holding company conducted by the holding company outside of the bank subsidiary line under
§ 225.4(0 of Regulation Y, the regulation governing bank holding compdnies. Unfortunately,
the three regulations were amalgamated in 1979 into the present single Regulation K, which
as a result of drafting complexity has been completely inscrutable since. See 44 Fed. Reg.
36,006 (1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1991)).
41. 12 U.S.C. § 611a.
42. Id.
43. In the late 1960s, for example, the Fed authorized Morgan's Edge Corporation, through
its purchase of a German bank with a small securities subsidiary, to engage in securities




Regulation K in the portions of the Regulation affecting the securities
activities of United States banks abroad and the powers of United States
banking organizations to acquire equity interests abroad, has confused
congressional policy directions emanating from the BHCA (the separation
of banking and commerce) and the Fed's legitimate area of concern with
United States banking organizations' Edge subsidiary activities and invest-
ments-the safety and soundness issues."
B. The 1991 Limitations on Dealing in Securities of Offshore
Companies: An Example of Intellectual Confusion
When the Fed announced the 1991 revisions, it claimed that they would
expand the existing authority to engage in underwriting and dealing in equity
securities outside the United States.4 1 The statement is true as to underwriting
authority, but the revisions to Regulation K so restrict the dealing powers
of United States bank-owned broker-dealers abroad, for reasons unrelated
to prudential considerations, that the capacity of the entities to compete
abroad in either underwriting or dealing may well be doubted.
When the Fed completely rewrote Regulation K after Congress passed the
1978 International Banking Act, it added to the list of permissible foreign
activities of Edge Corporations the securities activities it had previously
approved by order for individual banks: underwriting, distributing, and
dealing in debt and equity securities outside the United States. Presumably
for prudential reasons, each equity underwriting commitment by a subsidiary
of an investor (a defined term) for shares of an issuer was limited to two
million dollars and could represent no more than twenty percent of the
capital and surplus or voting shares of the issuer."
These limits were placed only on equity underwriting commitments, not
on dealing in equity securities. The 1979 Regulation restricted dealing in
44. In fairness to present staff, it must be pointed out that Regulation K has, at least since
the Fed's general consent to equity investments was codified in 1969, limited Edge investment
in voting stock of companies to not more than 25%, presumably to ensure that banks did not
get into activities through foreign subsidiaries abroad that they would not be permitted to do
at home-but the original theory of the restriction seems to have been prudential. Foreign
Acquisitions of U.S. Banks and the Non-Banking Activities of Foreign Bank Holding Com-
panies: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, House of
Representatives, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 372 (1980) (statement of Henry C. Wallich, Member,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Present staff are explicit in their belief
that the BHCA § 4, 12 U.S.C. § 1843, prohibition should be read through into Edge
"holdings," but seem unaware of the import of the BHCA § 4(c)(5) exemption.
45. See Federal Reserve Press Release, Aug. 1, 1990 (copy on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(13) (1991).
[Vol. 67:251
BANK HOLDINGS
equity securities only by an ultimate limit coming out of a separate provision
of Regulation K. This provision related to the total amount of shares (and
subordinated debt where shares were also owned) an investor could own in
nonfinancial companies. 47 The limit, which is called the "aggregate portfolio
investment limit," is measured by 100 percent of the investor's capital and
surplus, and the provision requires counting for the purpose of the limit
"securities held in trading or dealing accounts." Diligent search of the Fed
materials available to the public has revealed no stated reason for the
inclusion of securities held in trading and dealing accounts in this limit, but
one assumes that, since the limit is dependent on a measure of the financial
strength of the holder (the measure that Congress used in 1919-a percentage
of capital and surplus of the investor), the aim was prudential.
This aggregate portfolio investment limit is retained by the final 1991
Regulation K revisions, but it is changed by (1) measuring it against Tier I
Capital"s of the investor, rather than against capital and surplus; (2) adding
to the limit underwriting commitments made under Edge Act authority; and
(3) adding to the limit any "portfolio investments" in nonfinancial com-
panies made by the "affiliates" of the investor. For bank holding companies,
the limit is now stated as twenty-five percent of Tier 1 Capital.
49
Since the 1991 revisions have changed the definition of "investment" to
include the ownership or control of "equity" and "equity" is defined to
include warrants and convertibles and "loans that provide rights to partic-
ipate in the profits of an organization," the calculation of the effect of the
revised aggregate limit on any particular bank's participation in the inter-
national capital markets outside the United States is unpredictable. Adding
in "affiliates" here could mean that if the banking organization, through
the holding company, engages in or if the holding company's subsidiaries
engage in certain types of domestic (or foreign) financing involving the
acquisition of warrants or loans that fall into the new definition of "equity,"
such financing activities will affect the quantum of inventory of shares that
the organization's foreign broker-dealer may hold. This is a possibility
because the aggregate limit is on all holdings of "equity" of nonfinancial
companies. °
47. Id. § 211.5(b)(1)(i)(C).
48. The term is defined in Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State Member Banks: Risk-
Based Measure, 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A (1991).
49. 56 Fed. Reg. 19,565 (1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(b)(iii)(A)(2)).
50. If the banking organization has a domestic securities affiliate, all "investments" in
"equity" owned by it would, under the literal language of the revisions, have to be counted,
except that revised Regulation K specifically exempts "shares" held by such an affiliate from
the computation. 56 Fed. Reg. 19,565 (1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(14)(iv)).
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Since the pre-1991 aggregate limit applied only to investments (as then
defined) made directly or indirectly by the entity whose capital was the test
and did not include organization-wide interests held by "affiliates," one
suspects that the above interpretation, including in the test "investments"
by "affiliates," is a drafting error not intended by the Fed. To test
organization-wide holdings of equity by the capital of an Edge Corporation
subsidiary or of a foreign bank subsidiary of a member bank is an anomaly.
Equally, the drafting is peculiar in that only "shares" held in trading or
dealing accounts authorized under the Edge Act are part of the calculation,
and nothing in revised Regulation K indicates whether the term "shares"
includes rights to acquire shares that are covered by the term "equity."
The Fed, in its preamble to the revisions, has suggested that the purpose
of the aggregate limitation is safety and soundness and that the limitation
has been adopted as revised "to make certain that the overall capitalization
of an investor is not impaired by market and other risks attendant to equity
holdings in nonaffiliated companies." '5'
The staff report to the Fed on the comments received on the revisions as
proposed admitted that the limit was a very rough surrogate for any measure
of market or position risk. 2 One cannot really quarrel with the Fed for
trying to adopt some prudential limitations on participation by United States
banks as broker-dealers in the international capital markets. However, why
underwriting or position risk should be specially appreciated for positions
in nonfinancial companies as opposed to positions in shares of financial
companies is not immediately apparent. Market risk is market risk, regard-
less of the nature of the issuer.
The distinction makes one think that, despite its protestations, the Fed
has taken its cue from the domestic policy against combining banking and
commerce and mixed prudential issues with the question of the nature of
the activities carried on by the "investee." The preamble to the revisions
also indicates that the Fed staff was aware of the adverse comments on the
provision as revised. The commentators stressed the inhibiting effect the
revisions might have on United States organizations' capacity to engage
competitively in underwriting and dealing in the international markets, and
the preamble states that the Board will monitor future developments "to
determine the continued appropriateness of the aggregate limitation." 3
Even if one cannot quarrel with the Fed over prudential limitations, using
the aggregate portfolio investment limit as a check on the risks of shares
held in trading and dealing accounts operated under Edge Act authority
51. Id. at 19,549, 19,555.
52. Presumably, the offshore broker-dealers are all subject to host country regulation in
their host countries. Certainly all broker-dealers in the United Kingdom, for example, are
subject to the Securities Industry Association's capital requirements, which have very sophis-
ticated measures of position risk in equity-dealing accounts.
53. 56 Fed. Reg. 19,555 (1991).
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would appear more reasonable in the case where there were no other
prudential limitations on that authority. However, the current set of revisions
directly addresses both the old limits on equities underwriting and the
question of setting direct prudential limits on the amounts of equities held
in trading or dealing accounts. The previous limit on underwriting commit-
ments of two million dollars per subsidiary has been changed to permit,
with the approval of the Board, underwriting commitments "by an investor
and its affiliates" (not including in "affiliates" a domestic securities affiliate
subsidiary) of up to the lesser of sixty million dollars or twenty-five percent
of the investor's Tier 1 Capital.54 There is also provision made for obtaining
special permission for additional underwriting authority over the sixty
million dollar limit on certain conditions relating to the capital of the bank
and its holding company where the securities activities are conducted by a
subsidiary of a United States bank.
The Board thus seems very much aware of the safety net issues where
the securities business is conducted inside the bank chain. However, just
what including the underwriting commitments in the aggregate portfolio
investment measure adds to this panoply of prudential limits is unclear.
Moreover, it is an anomaly to include underwriting commitments in an
"investment" limitation for another reason.
The provisions in Regulation K on investments by Edge Corporations
implement the section of the Edge Act giving Edge Corporations the power
to "purchase and hold stock." On October 19, 1979, Frederick R. Dahl,
then Associate Director of the Division of Banking Supervision and Regu-
lation, circulated to the officers in charge of international applications at
each Federal Reserve Bank a set of "Questions and Answers" on the then
new Regulation K issued in 1979. Page three contains the following question:
"May foreign subsidiaries underwrite and distribute abroad the shares of
United States companies or of foreign companies that transact business in
the United States that is [sic] not incidental to international or foreign
business?" The answer was "Yes. The statutory limitations on investments
in companies doing business in the United States refer to the holding of
shares and not to the underwriting of shares. ' 55
Had this interpretation by the Fed staff in 1979 also been explicitly
drafted to say that dealing in shares (that is, having an inventory of shares
of an issuer for sale as a dealer) under the 1979 securities authority is not
the "holding" of shares for the purposes of the Edge Act limitations on
54. The former permissible deduction of binding commitments from subunderwriters or
other purchasers is still included.
55. Letter with attached Questions and Answers on Revised Regulation K from Frederick
R. Dahl, Associate Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to the Officer in Charge of International Applications
at Each Federal Reserve Bank (Oct. 19, 1979) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
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investments, the present staff might have been saved a great deal of
difficulty. It is in the 1991 Regulation K revisions to regulate foreign
securities dealing by United States banking organizations that the greatest
intellectual confusion concerning the policy of limiting "investment" in
nonfinancial companies, and the need for prudential supervision, seems to
have arisen.
While an inventory of the equity securities of an issuer certainly entails
risk, it is the typical risk of any dealer that the goods will not be sold at
a profit, that the market for the goods will fall or disappears& The dealer
has an investment in his inventory; he has not made an "investment" in
the particular issuer in any sense known to Congress when it gave Edge
Corporations the authority to "purchase and hold stock" in companies not
in commercial business in the United States.
Nevertheless, the Regulation K revisions as proposed would have limited
authorized dealing to equity securities of foreign issuers and not permitted
the securities affiliates to deal in securities of United States issuers. The
commentators, of course, pointed out that to so revise Regulation K would
put United States banks' foreign securities affiliates out of business. The
natural customers for underwriting are United States corporations raising
capital abroad; a broker-dealer that does not end up with an inventory of
the issue to provide continuing liquidity for the offering will not be asked
to bid for the underwriting.
The final revision permits dealing in the shares of United States organi-
zations as well as shares of non-United -States organizations, but limits the
dealing in United States issuer shares to dealing with "foreign persons"
only. "Foreign person" is defined in the revision as being an office or
establishment located, or individual residing, outside the United States, thus
keeping the overseas arms of United States broker-dealers available as
counterparties for United States banks' securities arms. The limitation is
apparently intended to ensure that the dealing stays offshore and that the
authorized broker-dealers are not used to evade the strict conditions limiting
the domestic securities business done by United States bank holding com-
panies in their domestic securities subsidiaries.
The second limitation put on dealing in shares of United States issuers,
however, is not supported by such a reasonable rationale. The revisions
impose upon a dealer's inventory of shares of a United States issuer a
limitation, lifted from the BHCA's prohibition in section 4 of the Act, on
the acquisition of five percent or more of the voting shares of any company
56. As the great securities law professor (and former SEC Commissioner) Louis Loss has
said, for the dealer, securities are no different than cans of beans.
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which is not a bank or otherwise falling into the exemptions from the
general prohibition set out in section 4.
There is no possible prudential justification for this restriction. 57 It surely
is no riskier to hold in inventory more than five percent of the voting
shares of a United States issuer than it is to hold five percent of the voting
shares of a non-United States issuer. Nor is marketability of publicly issued
shares determined by their being voting or nonvoting.
Moreover, the terms of the BHCA do not require the Fed to impose this
limitation on shares of United States issuers held in dealing accounts. First,
the BHCA, while it has a special exemption from section 4 for shares of
foreign companies doing the greater part of their business outside the United
States, does not base any exemption simply on the place of incorporation
of the issuer. Thus, the distinction made in this dealing limitation between
United States organizations and non-United States organizations makes no
sense in terms of the BHCA.
Second, the Board has interpreted the BHCA's restrictions on "owning
or controlling" shares to mean that the restrictions do not apply to shares
taken by foreign bank holding companies (whose securities activities abroad
are not prohibited by Glass-Steagall) in an underwriting, 8 paralleling in
effect the 1979 Fed staff interpretations of the Edge Act and underwriting.
59
In a classical underwriting, the shares are purchased by the underwriter and
then resold pursuant to subunderwriting commitments, as recognized by
Regulation K in its deduction for commitments from subunderwriters or
other purchasers. If acquiring shares for distribution as an underwriter is
not "owning or controlling" shares for BHCA purposes, why should a
temporary passage of such shares through inventory be subject to the
BHCA's attempt to separate the ownership of commercial enterprises from
the ownership of the allocators of credit?
57. Indeed, the Fed staff does not attempt a prudential rationale for this limitation. The
preamble to the Federal Register publication of the 1991 revisions states:
This determination [that it is permissible to deal in shares of U.S. issuers because
shares held in inventory are not "held" within the meaning of the Edge provisions]
with respect to the shares of U.S. issuers must, however, take account of the
provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act ("BHC Act"), under which a
U.S. banking organization may not generally acquire more than 5 percent of the
voting shares and 24.9 percent of the total equity of a U.S. company. Therefore,
a bank holding company may not exceed these limits on an aggregate basis, even
where such shares are held in a foreign securities subsidiary and regardless of
whether the ownership of the subsidiary is through a bank holding company or
an Edge corporation that is a subsidiary of a bank. Banking organizations
engaged in securities activities domestically through the section 20 structure are
subject to these same limitations.
56 Fed. Reg. 19,551-52 (1991).
58. 12 C.F.R. § 225.124 (1991).
59. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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The policy concern behind section 4 of the BHCA is that if a bank and
the enterprises to which it lends are commonly owned the credit decision
may be distorted by the desire to favor the enterprise in which the bank
owner has an interest. Inventory holdings, however, are not investments
which raise this concern. The last thing that a dealer in securities is interested
in is the long-term profit to be made from owning a controlling interest in
an enterprise that prospers. The dealer makes its money from selling
inventory at more than it cost to purchase.6°
Finally, the revisions have made explicit two other limitations on dealing
in equity securities, 6' neither of which seems to relate to the Fed's proper
oversight of the safety and soundness of Edge Corporation operations. First
is the limitation (buried in the interstices of the text of the regulation) that
the total of voting shares of an organization engaged in nonfinancial
activities held by an investor or its affiliates, including shares held in Edge
Act authorized trading or dealing accounts, must be limited to twenty
percent of the voting shares of the organization so engaged.6 2 Thus the
capacity of a banking organization's foreign securities business to deal and
market-make in the voting shares of an organization in which other divisions
of the banking enterprise have also invested is limited by the quantity of
such investment.
This limitation makes little sense. The preamble explains that voting
shares in dealing accounts were included in the limitation on holdings of
voting shares of nonfinancial companies in the organization's investment
accounts because "[w]ithout such limitation, there is a potential for evasion
of the prohibition on exercising control over nonfinancial companies, through
holding substantial blocks of equity in both an investment and dealing
account." 63 If indeed the Fed fears that investment limitations will be evaded
by hiding shares in dealing accounts, surely the remedy here is to alert
examiners to this possibility or to ensure that voting shares in dealing
60. To the extent that access to credit might make a company's shares more desirable to
a buyer, a dealer overloaded with one company's shares might try to publicize the company's
newly found financing, but this scenario is truly peculiar. One would imagine that the putative
buyer might be as pleased to make the same purchase of the enhanced stock from another
dealer. In any event, if the fear (however unfounded) is preferential access to credit, isn't the
cure the extension of a firewall between the bank and any company in which an affiliated
broker-dealer has obtained over a certain size share? Why should the dealing business of the
broker-dealer in the highly competitive international capital markets be hobbled with a
constraint unrelated either to the nature of the business or to its soundness? (The Bank of
England does prohibit the clearing banks it regulates from taking in their securities business
more than 10% of an issue, but the focus of the rule is the prudential issue of a large exposure
and no distinction is made as to the nature of the issuer.)
61. These limitations are distinct from the inclusion of shares held in trading and dealing
accounts in the "aggregate portfolio investment limit" discussed above. See supra notes 47-55
and accompanying text.
62. 56 Fed. Reg. 19,566 (1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(o)).
63. Id. at 19,553 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211).
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accounts are not voted. To restrict the dealer's business judgment as to the
desirable size of inventory for fear that such accounts will be used for
"impermissible" investments is simply to burden United States bank parti-
cipants in the international secondary markets. That this restriction is not
related at all to safeness or soundness or concern for the safety net is also
demonstrated by the fact it does not apply to inventory holdings of the
voting stock of financial companies. Again, market risk is market risk;
certain shares are more prone to volatility than others, but the proper
dividing line is surely not the one the Fed is using here.
4
The same comments would apply to an additional limit imposed in the
revisions-again presumably because the Fed has convinced itself that shares
in inventory are nevertheless to be counted for determining "control"-on
the total quantum of equity of nonfinancial companies that may be held
by an investor and its affiliates (other than a section 20 subsidiary) in any
nonfinancial organization, a total which is now forty percent of the total
equity. Once again, the broker-dealer will need elaborate counting systems
which scan the entire banking organization to ensure that all shares or other
equity interests held anywhere for any purpose (other than trading or dealing
in a United States broker-dealer subsidiary) are counted before the offshore
broker-dealer can determine how much room there is for the inventory of
the issuer's shares. The result of any prohibition stated in terms of a
percentage of an issuer's voting shares or equity is to require elaborate
tracking systems to count perfectly legitimate business. If the total is needed
for a prudential limit, the cost of counting the total may be justified. If
the reason for the limit is to control overreaching, a firewall would serve
better. It does not require a tracking mechanism to ensure that there are
no violations; it requires only a compliance manual to instruct lending
officers as to what transactions would constitute a breach. Lists of who
may not be lent to are cheap to generate and examiners can take care of
the "evaders." The costs of thoughtless application of one act's system of
policy implementation to another act's authorized dealing are thus clear.
III. REVISED REGUA TION K LMITATIONS ON EDGE CORPORATION
INVESTMENTS: ILLUSTRATION Two OF CONFUSION
The 1991 revisions of Regulation K's investment authority provide another
illustration of the confusion between BHCA policy implementation and
64. While the original 1979 limitation on underwriting, 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(13), limited
the uncovered commitment to less than 20% of the issuer's voting shares, that limitation made
no distinction between financial and nonfinancial companies.
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Edge Act implementation.65 The thesis of this Part is that the 1991
Regulation K scheme covering Edge Corporation investments,6 while less
65. This Article does not address the difficult question of whether commercial firms should
be permitted to own banks and bank holding companies. The most comprehensive, sensible,
and cogent discussion of this question is Corrigan, supra note 2, at 1-13.
This Article assumes at all times that the top parent company is a company regulated by
banking supervisors under a scheme of consolidated supervision, filing consolidated financial
statements in accordance with banking supervisors' rules, and adhering to the capital adequacy
requirements demanded of a company, one of whose subsidiaries is a depository bank having
access to the federal safety net. Consolidated supervision means that the home country regulator
supervises the entire banking organization's business, including the business of its foreign
subsidiaries. For an excellent definition of the term "federal safety net," see id. at 2.
It should also be noted that it is immaterial to the argument whether the foreign investment
is made by the holding company or its Edge subsidiary, or by the depository bank through
an Edge whose stock is owned by the bank under the Edge Act authorization, 12 U.S.C. §
601 (1988), to national banks to so invest. Some bank holding companies, notably Security
Pacific Corporation, conduct their Edge-type business and investments through an Edge
Corporation owned by the holding company; most others, such as Chase Manhattan Corpo-
ration and Citicorp, own their Edges through the money center national bank which created
and invested in the Edge structure before entering into a one-bank holding company structure
in the 1960s. It is mainly because the present structure of firewalls contained in sections 23A
and B of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988), now distinguishes between affiliates
owned by the holding company other than in the subsidiary bank or bank line and affiliates
held through subsidiary banks that how the foreign investments are held is important. This
Article assumes that any sensible legislative or regulatory correction of the present scheme of
limits on foreign investment would amend sections 23A and B to provide for limits on Edge
affiliate dealings to prevent conflicts of interest and self-dealing, if necessary and/or advisable,
regardless of the place of the nonfinancial affiliate in the corporate structure.
When the foreign investment is in the stock of foreign banks and other financial institutions,
imposing the strictures of sections 23A and B on the investment clearly would only impede
normal correspondent relationships between the U.S. bank subsidiary and the foreign financial
institutions in the bank holding company system; it is in this area that the distinction between
financial and nonfinancial affiliates makes sense. The corporate structure through which the
investment is made should not determine the issue.
66. Although the Fed at first separated United States bank holding company foreign
investment (covering the topic in its implementation of the BHCA in Regulation Y) from its
implementation of the Edge Act in Regulation K (and national bank direct foreign investment
in the defunct Regulation M), the Fed in the 1979 revision of Regulation K after enactment
of the International Banking Act of 1978 folded the provisions of Y regulating bank holding
company foreign activities and investments into Regulation K. Although the drafting exigencies
of the combination made Regulation K a horror to parse, the idea made sense. Essentially,
bank holding companies get the authority to take the voting "shares which are of the kinds
and amounts eligible for investment by national banking associations" so long as the investees
are "not engaged in the general business of buying or selling goods, wares, merchandise or
commodities in the United States," 12 U.S.C. § 615(c), and are not transacting business in
the United States other than business that is incidental to its foreign or international business,
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (1988). National banks are authorized to invest in the stock of Edges,
presumably meaning Edges whose own investments are made under the provisions of the Edge
Act authorizing ownership of stock by Edge Corporations in other corporations. Thus when
the Board exercises its authority under the Edge Act to consent to Edge investments, it is also
setting the limits of bank holding company investment under section 4(c)(5) of the BHCA.
Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, whenever this Article hereafter refers to "Edge invest-
ment," a similar investment by a bank holding company directly or indirectly without the
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flawed than the scheme for limiting the inventory holdings of United States
banking organizations' foreign broker-dealers, because an investor can al-
ways make a special application to the Fed, also suffers from the intellectual
confusion that is engendered when the domestic policy of separating banking
and commerce is exported from the BHCA into implementation of a
different statutory mandate with a different history and a totally different
policy approach.6 7
Section 4 of the BHCA, 68 the section of the Act forbidding any bank
holding company to acquire or "retain direct or indirect ownership or
control of any voting shares of any company which is not a bank [as
defined] or bank holding company," ' 69 exempts "shares which are of the
kinds and amounts eligible for investment by' 70 national banks. National
banks are specifically authorized to invest up to an aggregate of ten percent
of capital and surplus in the stock of Edge and Agreement Corporations7 '
to "purchas[e] and holdil stock in any corporation," 72 so long as that
corporation is not "engaged in the general business ' 73 of buying and selling
in the United States and is only transacting within the United States business
that is in the Board's judgment "incidental to its international or foreign
business." 74 Nothing in this statutory authority suggests that Congress
wanted to confine the businesses that Edge Corporations might invest in or
interposition of an Edge is also referred to.
The Fed itself does not make this simple section 4(c)(5) national bank-Edge Corporation
investment authority connection. Instead, judging from the citation of authority in 12 C.F.R.
§ 211.1(c), the "scope" section of Regulation K, the Fed thinks it is regulating in Regulation
K the authorization given in section 4(c)(13) of the BHCA. This section allows bank holding
companies to invest in shares of (or activities conducted by) any company "which does no
business in the United States except as an incident to its international or foreign business," if
the Fed determines that the exemption "would not be substantially at variance with the
purposes of this chapter and would be in the public interest." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13). Perhaps
it is because the Fed staff thought, in amalgamating portions of Regulations Y and K, that
they were implementing section 4(c)(13) as well as section 4(c)(9) for foreign bank holding
companies that they got so tangled up with BHCA banking/commerce policy.
67. The policy of the Edge Act is "to provide for the establishment of international banking
and financial corporations operating under Federal supervision with powers sufficiently broad
to enable them to compete effectively with similar foreign-owned institutions in the United
States and abroad." 12 U.S.C. § 611a. Certainly there is not a word in 12 U.S.C. § 611a to
suggest that BHCA banking/commerce separation policy was to be exported to Edge activities
abroad.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1843.
69. Id. § 1843(a).
70. Id. § 1843(c)(5).
71. 12 U.S.C. § 601.
72. Id. § 615(c).
73. Id. For a theory of what Congress meant when it used the term "general business"
with regard to a national bank, see Lowry Nat'l Bank, 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 81 (1911). General
business presumably means other than incidental to foreign headquarters business, and does
not mean, for example, the quantum of mercantile business that might suffice to trigger United
States or state jurisdiction over the company.
74. 12 U.S.C. § 615(c).
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take what might be considered "control" of the banking and financial
businesses. Congress's concern, at least so far as the Fed's own research
into the legislative history of the Edge Act goes,7 5 was with the power of
banking and financial corporations to monopolize trade.
A. Control or Passive Investment: The Voting Stock Measurement
In the past, the Fed staff has recognized that the Edge Act itself places
"no limits ... on the kinds of activities that a corporation whose shares
are held by an Edge Corporation may engage in abroad. ' 76 However,
according to the 1980 Staff Memorandum, "The Board ... in administering
the statute has tended to stress the purpose of Edge Corporations of serving
as a means of engaging in 'banking' and 'financial' operations abroad.""
The 1980 Staff Memorandum goes on to describe the structure of the 1979
Regulation K, which for the first time articulated that "[a]ctivities of
investors abroad, whether conducted directly or indirectly, shall be confined
to those of a banking or financial nature and those that are necessary to
carry on such activities. 78 At no place in either the 1980 Staff Memorandum
or the preamble to the 1979 revisions of Regulation K was there any
extensive explanation as to why the Board had chosen to so restrict the
offshore activities (direct or through foreign subsidiaries of an Edge Cor-
poration) of United States banking organizations. 79 Indeed, in the case of
75. See 56 Fed. Reg. 19,551 (1991). "The legislative history of the Edge Act demonstrates
that the Congress was concerned that the ownership of U.S. equity securities by Edge
corporations could permit Edge corporations to monopolize the businesses that they were
intended to finance ..... Id. This quotation from the preamble to the 1991 Regulation K
revisions uses a curious phraseology. The statute as quoted does not show any particular
concern by Congress with United States equity securities; it does indeed indicate Congress's
concern that Edges not invest in stock in corporations doing business in the United States,
whatever the jurisdiction of incorporation, and the language of the Edge statute goes right
back to the old Charter of the Bank of England and fear of banks monopolizing trade. This
particular fear would not seem apposite, say, to Edge control of a hotel in Mexico or a toy
manufacturer in Switzerland.
76. Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Banks and the Non-Banking Activities of Foreign Bank
Holding Companies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary
Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 561 (1980)
(staff memorandum of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter
1980 Staff Memorandum].
77. Id.
78. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,010 (1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(a) (1991)).
79. The closest the 1980 Staff Memorandum comes to an explanation is the following
statement:
The Board's regulations with respect to portfolio investments are designed to
afford Edge Corporations a degree of flexibility in their foreign operations
particularly in instances where small equity acquisitions may be a part of a
financing transaction. At the same time, the limits imposed ensure that Edge
Corporations do not serve solely as holding companies for investments in com-
mercial enterprises.
1980 Staff Memorandum, supra note 76, at 562.
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Edge Corporations, one must accept the word of the 1979 preamble that
the limitation had been the policy of the Fed in the past. As noted by the
preamble, "Until now, the activities that could be engaged in abroad could
only be determined by reference to individual Board consents to particular
investments. "80 Until 1969, the Regulation K Edge Corporation investment
provision, then 12 C.F.R. § 211.8, only provided that Edge Corporations
needed prior specific consent of the Board "with respect to the acquisition
of any shares" other than purchases of stock to prevent loss on debts
previously contracted."
That the Board in the past was, presumably for reasons relating to the
issue of the propriety of a banking or financing corporation owning 2 a
commercial company, examining any proposed Edge Corporation investment
that would permit the Edge Corporation to control the acquisition is
indicated by the addition, in 1969, of a "general consent" authority to the
then-Regulation K investment provision.83 By that provision, Edge Corpo-
rations were allowed to make investments, directly or indirectly, without
receiving the specific consent of the Board, in "shares of foreign corpora-
tions not doing business in the United States"84 so long as the Edge
Corporation did not invest more than $500,000 in the shares or "hold more
than 25 percent of the voting shares, of any such corporation."s The
amount limitation simply guaranteed that the Board would get a prior look
at any significant Edge Corporation expenditure for shares. It is the limi-
tation on the holding of the voting shares of the investee that is of interest.
International investment literature distinguishes between "direct invest-
ment," where the multinational is itself entering a country by the means of
acquisition or establishment of a subsidiary, and "portfolio investment,"
where the investor is purchasing interests in foreign entities in order to
diversify its portfolio. With portfolio investment, the aim truly is "passive"
investment to earn dividend and interest or capital gain income and not to
expand abroad the business of the investor.
Regulation K's original limitation on portfolio investment in voting shares
is similar to the way in which the BHCA defines "subsidiary." Under the
BHCA definition, a subsidiary is "any company 25 per centum or more of
whose voting shares... is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by
such bank holding company" or "any company the election of a majority
of whose directors is controlled in any manner by such bank holding
company." 8 6
80. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,007 (1979).
81. 12 C.F.R. § 211.8(a) (1969) (current version at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(c)(3) (1991)).
82. As opposed to taking equity interests in a commercial company as part of financing.
83. 34 Fed. Reg. 614 (1969) (current version at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(c)(1) (1991)).
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. The definition also includes "any company with respect to the management of policies
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The BHCA definition of subsidiary is presumably related to the concept
of expansion of a bank holding company. One would therefore imagine
that it was that definition of subsidiary that influenced the Board to deny
general consent to an Edge Corporation investment, regardless of expendi-
ture, in more than twenty-five percent of the voting stock of an investee.
In short, in 1969, the Board said that when an Edge Corporation expanded
its own business through a direct investment, the Board wanted to have a
prior look at the proposed investment before approving it. On the other
hand, the 1969 change in Regulation K meant that defined portfolio in-
vestments of $500,000 or less, regardless of the business of the investee,
were preauthorized.
Again, one must take the word of the 1980 Staff Memorandum that the
Board was in the habit of denying direct investments in nonfinancial-type
businesses by Edge Corporations, but the 1969 change to Regulation K as
well as the 1980 Staff Memorandum statement8 that Edge Corporations are
not to serve as holding companies for ownership of commercial enterprises
suggest that to have been the policy. Given that in 1919 Congress seemed
to be encouraging the movement of venture capital to war-torn Europe
through the Edge mechanism and that the legislative history of the Edge
Act is barren of any suggestion that Congress wanted Edges to be able to
engage in nonfinancial-type business abroad, the Board's policy choice is
not astounding. However, it is certain that in 1969, there was no elaborate
scheme of counting "equity" to determine "control" or even any reference
whatsoever in the provisions for Edge investments to the five percent of
voting stock standard of the BHCA for the prohibition on the ownership
of nonfinancial companies.
The 1979 revision of Regulation K carried out the Board's intention not
to permit Edge Corporations to take entrepreneurial control of nonfinancial
companies by making explicit the definition of "subsidiary" for Edge Act
investment authority purposes. The revision stated that a "subsidiary" is
"an organization more than 50 percent of the voting shares of which is
held directly or indirectly by the investor, or which is otherwise controlled
or capable of being controlled by the investor or an affiliate of the
investor.""3 The Board also made clear that only banking or financial-type
subsidiaries could be acquired and, in an effort to improve transparency,
of which such [bank holding company] has the power, directly or indirectly, to exercise a
controlling influence, as determined by the Board, after notice and opportunity for hearing."
12 U.S.C. § 1841(d)(3) (emphasis added). The statutory definition of "subsidiary" in the
BHCA would seem to preclude a definition of control through a set of presumptions as to
the total quantum of equity held (without power to elect the Board), without the Board holding
a hearing to determine a controlling influence in a specific case.
87. See 1980 Staff Memorandum, supra note 76, at 555-68.
88. 12 C.F.R. § 2 11. 2 (p) (1991).
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listed in § 211.5(d) 9 just what banking or financial activities would qualify
for a general consent investment in a subsidiary. If an investor wished to
"invest'"'9 in a subsidiary engaged in a banking or financial activity not on
the list, it had to apply for specific consent. 91 However, if an investor
wished to take shares in a company engaged in business not on the permitted
list, that is, take shares in a nonfinancial or "commercial" company, it
was permitted to do so only up to an aggregate of less than twenty percent
of the voting stock.92 The aggregate included in the computation voting
stock held directly or indirectly by an "affiliate," essentially another entity
in the banking organization.
Thus Regulation K in its 1979 form set up a scheme for distinguishing
between direct investment and portfolio (noncontrolling, "passive") invest-
ments by Edge Corporations. If the Edge or one of its subsidiaries was
making the investment to run the business as part of the banking enterprise,
the purchased company or joint venture was not to be a commercial
company, even though the list of permitted activities was considerably
broader than would be permitted to a banking organization in the United
States (including, for instance, underwriting and dealing in debt and equity).
Indeed, if the investee engaged in activities that the investor considered to
be "usual in connection with the transaction of the business of banking or
other financial operations abroad," but these financial activities were not
on the permitted list, the 1979 Regulation K provided for application to the
Board. 93 However, where the investment was clearly only a portfolio one,
with less than twenty percent of the voting shares being taken, the investment
could be in a company engaged in any kind of business, so long as that
business was not conducted in the United States.
While one can question the Board's policy decision to narrow the literal
terms of the Edge Act so as to prevent Edge Corporations from making
foreign direct investments in nonfinancial companies, one cannot fault the
system for distinguishing between portfolio and direct investments. Using
twenty percent of voting stock as a test for the dividing line between the
two types of holdings was perfectly reasonable if what was at issue was a
question of corporate control. While the definition of "investment" then
included the taking of subordinated debt when shares in the investee were
89. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,007, 36,011 (as codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)).
90. The 1979 Regulation K defined the term "investment" as "the ownership or control
of shares ... including the holding of an organization's subordinated debt when shares of
stock of the organization are also held directly or indirectly by an investor." Id. at 36,008.
91. See 1980 Staff Memorandum, supra note 76.
92. The 1979 scheme also provided for direct investments in financial-type companies with
other investors, so-called "joint ventures," with voting stock up to 50% being permitted and
the investees being permitted to have no more than 10% of consolidated assets or revenues
attributable to nonfinancial activities. 44 Fed. Reg. at 36,010 (as codified at 12 C.F.R. §
211.5(b)(1)(i)(B)).
93. Id. at 36,011.
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also held, this definition was not the test for the distinction between portfolio
and direct investment. Only voting stock mattered for that computation or,
if, in fact, the investor and/or its affiliates actually controlled or could
control the company acquired.94
B. The Test for Prudence: Amount Invested,
Not Amount of Voting Stock
Having distinguished between types of investment, the Board in the 1979
Regulation K nevertheless did not relinquish supervision of the prudence of
both types of investments. The test, however, for prudence was correlated
to the amount of the investment. In 1969 the Board had provided for
preauthorized ("general consent") investments by Edges so long as not
more than $500,000 was invested and not more than twenty percent of the
voting stock was acquired. In the 1979 Regulation K the Board continued
to preauthorize certain Edge investments but redrafted the application
procedures "to reduce the number of routine investment applications that
must be acted on by the Board .... Specific consent will be necessary only
for investments which because of their size or some other aspect of the
proposal, deserve Board consideration. " 95
The Board determined that investments in new kinds of financial opera-
tions not on the permissible list would require a specific application to the
Board, but that was the only distinction depending upon the type of activities
of the investee. Otherwise, the issue always was size of investment. The
1979 Regulation K raised the general consent amount limit to the lesser of
two million dollars or five percent of the investor's capital and surplus,9
regardless of whether the investment was in a company engaged in financial
or nonfinancial activities.
Under the 1979 Regulation K, when the investor wanted to put more than
two million dollars into a company engaged in permissible activities but the
amount to be invested did not exceed ten percent of the investor's capital
and surplus, the investor simply had to give the Board sixty days written
notice so that the Board might during the notification period disapprove
the investment, suspend the time period, or require that an application be
filed by the investor for the Board's specific consent. This ensured that any
investment in a subsidiary or joint venture exceeding ten percent of the
94. It is notable that at no time since the 1979 Regulation K has the Board or staff ever
spoken as to the meaning of the term "controlled or capable of being controlled" as used in
the definition of "subsidiary."
95. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 36,007 (1979) (as codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211).
96. In the case of an Edge Corporation not engaged in banking, the top limit if less than




investor's capital or surplus (the statutory limit in the Edge Act) would
require specific consent on the part of the Board.9 Any portfolio investment
over the lesser of two million dollars or the permitted percentage of capital
had to be pursued under the specific consent procedure.
Apart from these prudential amount limitations to ensure that the Board
specifically reviewed investments over a certain size, the Board included one
other limitation in the 1979 revision to ensure that the total quantum of
investment in nonfinancial activities did not threaten the capitalization of
the Edge. The Board provided that the total amount of portfolio investments
that could be made in all nonfinancial organizations would be limited by
an amount equal to 10070 of the investor's capital and surplus.9 Evidently
the Board felt the need for a total ceiling on the permissible amount of
portfolio investments in shares for safety and soundness reasons. This
assumption is made because this limitation was not calibrated to voting
stock, but necessarily included in the calculation, because of the definition
of "investment," all voting or nonvoting shares held and subordinated debt
in any organization in which shares were held.
The 1979 revisions also provided that securities held in trading or dealing
accounts had to be included in making the calculation of whether further
portfolio investments could be made.9 One assumes that the inclusion of
the trading and dealing shares was for the purpose of imposing a rough
ceiling on the risk of holding shares in dealing accounts, although as noted
previously in connection with the discussion of the limitations on securities
dealings imposed by the 1991 revisions, when one is discussing a trading or
dealing account, differentiating between shares of a nonfinancial company
and a financial company makes no intellectual sense. However, in 1979, it
seems most unlikely that the few United States banking organizations
engaged in broker-dealer operations abroad made a market in bank shares
at all. What is important to recognize is that this aggregate portfolio
investment limitation appears to have had nothing whatsoever to do with
any attempt to keep Edges out of commercial business since that was already
taken care of by the limitation on investment in nonfinancial companies to
less than twenty percent of the voting stock. °°
97. Id. at 36,010-11 (as codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5).
98. Id. at 36,010 (as codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5). See text at note 47.
99. Id. (as codified at § 211.5(b)(1)(i)(C)).
100. In several places, the 1991 revisions insist that this aggregate portfolio investment
limitation include in the calculation as well shares in "underwriting accounts," but it is
impossible to discover any place in either the 1979 Regulation K or the 1985 revision any
limitations on underwriting commitments other than those stated in the respective activity list,
that is the limitation to $2 million and less than 20% of the capital and surplus or voting
stock of the issuer. At no time prior to 1991 did Regulation K limit underwriting in equity
securities by the amount of capital of the underwriter. Of course, it may be assumed that the




This basic, sensible scheme for oversight of Edge Corporation investments
was very little changed by the 1985 congressionally mandated revisions. 10'
The dollar general consent limitation was raised from two million dollars 1°2
to fifteen million dollars'03 (although the alternative test of percentage of
the investor's capital and surplus remained the same as in the 1979 version).
The period for the Board to act when given prior notice was reduced to
forty-five days, and a provision was added that "the Board may waive the
forty-five day period if it finds immediate action is required by the circum-
stances."' 4 This presumably permitted an investor to receive accelerated
action from the Board where an acquisition was moving along at a snappy
pace.
The Board seems to have been talked into making two other apparently
small changes which may have begun the Fed staff's intellectual confusion
in reading the domestic policy of separating banking and commerce into
the Regulation K scheme for foreign investments of Edges. 0 5 However, in
no other way did the 1985 revisions move over into the Regulation K
investment provisions any of the scheme contained for the separation of
banking and commerce in the BHCA and Regulation Y. For that, it was
necessary to await the 1991 revisions.
101. 50 Fed. Reg. 39,974, 39,984-85 (1985) (as codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5).
102. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,007, 36,010 (1979) (as codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(c)(1)(i)(A)).
103. 50 Fed. Reg. 39,974, 39,984 (1985) (as codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(c)(1)(i)(A)).
104. Id.
105. Under the 1979 revision, any investment that fell into the "subsidiary" category could
only be in a company all of whose activities conformed to the permissible list unless the
investor went specifically to the Board for an exemption. Apparently recognizing that for
Edges or subsidiaries of Edges making acquisitions of foreign banking or financial companies
it might be impossible to find such acquisitions that were totally "clean" (in the sense that
all of their activities fell within the Board's conception of what was usual in banking abroad),
the Board added a de minimis provision to 12.C.F.R. § 211.5(b)(1)(i)(A). It provided that "in
the case of an acquisition of a going concern, existing activities that are not otherwise
permissible for a subsidiary may account for not more than five percent of either the
consolidated assets or revenues of the acquired organization." 50 Fed. Reg. 39,974, 39,983
(1985) (as codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(c)(1)(i)(A)).
In a more interesting and more problematic change, the Board revised what it called the
"divestiture" provision in the 1979 and 1985 Regulation K. This was a provision which in
effect repeated the statutory limitations on Edge investments concerning activities in the United
States and provided that an investor should dispose of an investment promptly, "(unless the
Board authorizes retention)," if the investee organization either engaged in impermissible
business in the United States or engaged in impermissible activities for the particular kind of
investment. However, it seems that the commentators on the proposed 1985 revisions sold the
staff the notion that since bank holding companies could acquire up to five percent of any
company, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6), whether United States or foreign, that was engaging in any
form of business, the Board should add to the divestiture provision the exception that "an
investor may hold up to 5% of the shares of a foreign company that engages directly or
indirectly in business in the United States that is not permitted to an Edge Corporation." 50
Fed. Reg. 39,974, 39,984 (1984) (as codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(b)(3)(i)(B)). In the case of
an Edge Corporation, the Board had no statutory authority to permit the Edge to make such
an investment since the Edge Act itself contains no such exception.
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IV. IMPORTING DoMEsTIc CONCERNS INTo THE EDGE ACT
In the early 1980s, the Fed became concerned with the apparent attempt
of banking organizations to avoid the restrictions under section 3 of the
Bank Holding Company Act on the acquisition of bank shares. The Act
phrased the restriction in terms of voting shares.1°6 However, the banking
organizations were purchasing nonvoting preferred stock and other forms
of interests in out-of-state banks which the banking organizations hoped to
acquire when and if the laws preventing nationwide banking by bank holding
companies were repealed. °7 The Fed responded by issuing a policy statement
in which it discussed the kind of arrangements under which so-called
"toehold acquisitions" in out-of-state banks were being made.1°8 The Fed
stated that "[a]fter a careful review of a number of these agreements, the
Board believes that investments in nonvoting stock, absent other arrange-
ments [that presumably might give "control"], can be consistent with the
act.,,lo9
At no place in the policy statement does the Fed set down any quantitative
limit on the amount of nonvoting shares that may be acquired; instead,
other indicia of "control" found in certain agreements between the acquiring
and acquired bank are discussed. Nor did the Fed in the policy statement
provide a set percentage as to when the acquisition of nonvoting equity in
other banks might give "control" so as to violate section 3 of the BHCA.
However, the Board did discuss one case of potential for control where the
investor holds a very large percentage of the acquiree's total equity. Thus
the Board indicated in its opinion that control of a company (meaning
another bank in the context of the policy statement) could be acquired by
taking nonvoting stock, depending upon the percentage of total equity held.
However, the Fed staff seized upon the policy statement and made a leap
from the policy statement's discussion of the acquisition of equity in the
context of section 3 of the BHCA to the question of the acquisition of
nonvoting interests in nonbanking companies under section 4 of the BHCA.
In an opinion entitled Acquisition of Nonbank Interests-Nonvoting Equity
Investments,110 the staff listed a number of indicia of carrying on forbidden
activities not permissible to bank holding companies through the medium
of an investee. Among those criteria are total investment representing more
than twenty-five percent of the total shareholders' equity of the nonbanking
106. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a).
107. Both H.R. 6 and S. 543, supra note 24, would repeal the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 36 (1988), and the "Douglas Amendment," 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988), so as to permit
nationwide banking by national banks, state member banks, and bank holding companies.
108. Statement of Policy on Nonvoting Equity Investments by Bank Holding Companies,
68 Fed. Res. Bull. 413 (1982).
109. Id. at 414.
110. Fed. Res. Regulatory Service 4-305.1 (1984).
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company. The staff opinion at that time did not state the percentage of
nonvoting equity as a hard and fast rule. The real issue, according to this
opinion, is whether the bank holding company is "more than a passive
investor, assuming the role of an entrepreneur in the organization, promotion
or operation of the non-banking company." We see here the same distinction
that the Fed was trying to make in Regulation K throughout its history.
However, in revising Regulation K in 1991, the staff has somehow decided
that the Board's policy statement "imposes a limit for noncontrolling invest-
ments of 25 percent of a company's total equity." '' Moreover, although the
policy statement referred only to nonvoting equity investments in banks, which
by definition do not create any additional prudential issues since banks acquired
by a bank holding company are subject in their own right to all of the banking
prudential restraints, the staff went on in the proposed 1991 revision's preamble
to claim that "[tlhe 25 percent ceiling was implemented both to limit an
investor's ability to control a company through nonvoting shares and to
impose prudential constraints upon the acquisition of nonvoting instru-
ments."" 2 The staff opinion, as it has been implemented by the staff, appears
to attempt to control the equity sweeteners banks were taking when financing
leveraged buyouts, an attempt presumably fueled by the Fed's legitimate
prudential concerns. ' 3 But the staffs 1991 revision of -Regulation K takes
these constraints, developed in the domestic context to control the process of
acquiring equity sweeteners, and applies them to the holding of nonvoting
equity in foreign nonbanking companies in a fashion that has almost completely
destroyed the careful scheme created by the Board in 1979 to regulate Edge
Corporation investments.
As is true of the 1991 revision's regulation of the foreign securities activities
of United States banking organizations, the staff apparently has confused the
concerns about "control" of nonfinancial entities with the concerns about
prudential limits, completely forgetting that the prudential limits on Edge
Corporation investments are set by the general consent dollar limitation." 
4
The limitation on the quantum of the percentage of voting stock the Edge
Corporation may hold in nonfinancial companies is related only to the issue
of control and the Fed's 1979, and probably earlier, conviction that Edge
111. 55 Fed. Reg. 32,424, 32,428 (1990) (as codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 211, 265 (1991)).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), OCC Examining Circular on
Leveraged Buyouts and Other Forms of Leveraged Transactions, reprinted at [1988-1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,529 (1988); Examination Guidelines
Regarding Highly Leveraged Financing Transactions, issued by Fed's Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation, William Taylor, Staff Director, Feb. 16, 1989.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 85 and 103. Beyond these limits, the investment,
whether in a financial or nonfinancial corporation, must be submitted to the Fed for review.
[V/ol. 67:251
BANK HOLDINGS
Corporations should not act as entrepreneurs in nonfinancial businesses. By
importing into the Edge scheme the domestic concerns about the total amount
of "equity" acquired by United States banking organizations, the staff has
produced a 1991 investment authority section which makes little sense and
will require, as does the offshore securities business authority, a banking
organization to make an organization-wide check of "equity" holdings it might
have acquired in any capacity." 5
Not only must a banking organization make a counting to determine whether
it can cover a particular Edge Corporation investment under the general
consent provisions or it will have to give notice to or make a specific application
to the Board, it must also make a counting to stay within the aggregate
portfolio investment limitation. This limit includes in the count shares held in
trading and dealing accounts, as well as (in the 1991 revision) shares for which
underwriting commitments have been made. The result is that not only is a
United States banking organization's securities business abroad constrained by
other activities of the organization, such as its portfolio investments by its
Edge Corporation, but the Edge Corporation also will have its investments
constrained both by the financing wing of the organization, which may be in
certain circumstances taking subordinated debt or other types of equity ac-
quired in today's so-called mezzanine financing, and by the quantum of its
securities business abroad. As with the constraints on the securities business,
this type of constraint on investment makes no intellectual sense. In the case,
however, of Regulation K investment authority, the constraints are less serious.
It simply means that the banking organization will have to make specific
application to the Board for review of investments which would, in the normal
course, without the revisions' requirements of adding into the count the total
equity holdings, be available to the organization under the general consent
limitation. It is also possible that since the revisions, instead of including in
the limit loans to the investee, as was proposed," 6 will permit holdings up to
forty percent of the total equity, without including loans, the revisions in
practice will not be a significant constraint on United States banking organi-
zations, apart from the unnecessary cost of elaborate tracking systems.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGiSnATWE ACTION
The intellectual confusion between prudential constraints and "control"
issues evident in the 1991 revisions to Regulation K is the product of Congress's
failure to properly separate those issues in the Bank Holding Company Act.
115. 56 Fed. Reg. 19,569 (1991) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5).
116. 55 Fed. Reg. 32,424, 32,436 (1990) (as codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(b)).
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Since the Fed in revising Regulation K took its cue from the policies expressed
by Congress in the BHCA, Congress -can alleviate the confusion both at home
and abroad by scrapping equity limitations as a means of addressing both
safety and soundness matters and self-dealing. In place of equity limitations
as a single means of addressing both concerns, Congress can implement
separate strategies already in place either in this country or in Europe for
each concern.
In considering the restructuring legislation now before it, Congress should
first recognize that its attempt to separate banking and commerce by a flat
five percent of voting stock is flawed because it uses that flat figure as a
bright line between bank holding company investments in nonfinancial com-
panies that are permissible and impermissible. The more appropriate concern
is not the level of investment, but as the Fed has recognized in previous
instances, the nature of the investment: whether it is intended to be entrepre-
neurial or passive.
17
Congress should also recognize that the Fed has compounded the problem
of intellectual confusion about its policies by exporting the domestic idea of
separating banking and commerce and the equity limitation mechanism for
implementing that idea into the regulation by which the Fed oversees the
international securities and investment activities of Edge Corporations. This
exportation of domestic concerns is clearly uncalled for because Edge Cor-
porations were established to serve different purposes than domestic bank
holding companies or their affiliates. There are better means of addressing
the twin concerns of prudence and overreaching and Congress should consider
them in any comprehensive restructuring.
Under a proper conception of safety and soundness, it is submitted that
the European Community's standard in the Second Banking Directive," is a
viable test for dealing with the question of how much equity in nonfinancial
companies is too much. That test only treats an interest in a nonfinancial
company as being significant to a bank's health when the interest exceeds ten
percent of the stock of the nonbanking company (a "qualified participation")
and when that qualified participation would amount to more than ten percent
of the bank's capital. Thus, the European Community utilizes Congress's
ultimate protection for member banks investing in Edge Corporations, a
limitation to ten percent of the capital of the investing member bank. 19
Shareholdings of less than ten percent of the investee are not considered,
apparently regardless of the amount such a shareholding would represent of
the capital of the investing bank. In other words, in the European Community,
shareholdings representing any proportion of the stock of a nonbanking
117. 63 Fed. Reserve Bull. 60 (1977).
118. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
119. 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
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company is permissible so long as they do not exceed in value ten percent of
the bank's capital. However, there is an aggregate limitation upon the quantum
of qualified participations in nonbanking companies of sixty percent of the
capital of the bank.'20
In the European Community scheme of limiting shareholdings by banking
organizations in nonfinancial companies, the concern is purely with prudential
standards. The European Community does not address at all the issue of
economic neutrality since, under the Directive, so long as the shareholding
remains below the aggregate of the limits measured by the bank's capital, the
bank can have any amount of control over the investee. However, if United
States policy should continue to be concerned with bank overreaching, that
is, with bank preference for companies in which the bank has an entrepre-
neurial interest, the way to deal with this is shown by the present provisions
of sections 23A and B of the Federal Reserve Act. 12 Section 23A at present
exempts subsidiaries of banks from its firewall provisions, without distinguish-
ing whether the subsidiary of the bank is a financial or nonfinancial subsidiary.
If section 23A were to be amended to distinguish among the types of bank
subsidiaries, it would be possible to limit, or even forbid, bank financing of
nonbank subsidiaries with deposits. It would be possible to provide that only
the holding company could lend to nonbanking subsidiaries, whether those
subsidiaries were held in the bank line or directly under the holding company.
There would be no limit on the amount of voting stock or on the amount of
total equity that the holding company and/or its subsidiary banks could hold,
provided that the prudential limits drafted along lines suggested by the
European Community's Second Banking Directive were in force.
Under a scheme such as this, even the distinction between an entrepreneurial
interest and a "passive investment" would be obviated, except for determining
when firewalls should have to be applied. If firewalls were to be used and a
bright line would be desirable, then at that point one could utilize the old
Regulation K standard instituted in 1969-that is, twenty-five percent of the
voting stock or actual control would trigger the firewalls. The BHCA would
no longer need to contain the section 4 standard of five percent of the voting
stock as the dividing line, and there would be no need for a staff-imposed
arbitrary figure of twenty-five percent of the equity. If the BHCA were
amended to itself provide a rational scheme for how bank investments in
nonbanking companies should be limited, there would be no need for the
elaborate counting schemes that have been imposed upon Edge Corporation
investments by the 1991 revisions to Regulation K. If the legislative changes
proposed in this Article were enacted, United States banking organizations
120. Second Banking Directive, supra note 22, at 7.
121. Supra note 17.
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would become truly competitive with their foreign counterparts, without any
diminution in the regulatory structure for safety and soundness and protection
of the federal safety net.
